INTRODUCTION
"Matrix organization is one of those management concepts, like Total Quality Management (TQM) or reengineering, that became very popular and then went through the management fashion cycle" writes Galbraith (2009, p.10) . He continues explaining that the matrix became popular in the 1970s and early 1980s and was wrongly adopted, hastily installed and inappropriately implemented by many organizations. Therefore, word spread that the matrix does not work. In 1982, Peters and Waterman wrote the death sentence to the matrix: Our favorite candidate for the wrong kind of complex response is the matrix organization structure (p.306). They explain that the matrix organization is very confusing, people do not know to whom they should report to, and virtually none of the excellent companies they surveyed informed that they had formal matrix with the exception of project management companies like Boeing. Galbraith (2009, p.9) says that this assertion is not true. Besides Boeing, Intel, Digital Equipment, Fluor, and Bechtel used a matrix. This did not change the overall perception and managers avoided matrix. It was only in the late 1990s that the matrix concept became accepted again by managers due to the successful use by some companies.
The prejudice against the matrix lingered on and in 2005, Bryan and Joyce wrote: …vertical oriented organizational structures, retrofitted with ad hoc and matrix overlays, nearly always make professional work more complex and inefficient (p. 26). They go on saying that matrix structures, designed to accommodate the secondary management axes that cut across vertical silos, frequently burden professionals with two bosses so they have to go up the organization before they can go across it. Contrasting with this negative opinion on the matrix in the same year The P&G case (Piskorski & Spaldini, 2007) is ideally suited to answer this question and demonstrate the pitfalls and benefits of the matrix. Today the matrix is the preferred organizational concept used by most large multinational, multi-brand, consumer-products companies that have to perform well in at least three dimensions such as products, functions, and regions. By using the P&G history, we can trace a parallel by the evolution of its organization and the schools of thought in organization structure design and the matrix organizations in particular. Besides the change in leadership at P&G from Durk Jager to A. G. Lafley is an opportunity to analyze their strategies, leadership profile and the human resource, rewards, information and process policies required to manage such a complex multidimensional matrix organization.
P&G ORGANIZATION EVOLVED FROM OWNER ADMINISTERED PRODUCTION IN 1837 TO MULTIDIVISIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE US IN 1954 AND IN EUROPE IN THE EARLY 1980S
P&G is an American multinational company based in Cincinnati, Ohio, clear separation of staff from line functions.
As individual ethic was giving way to social ethic in the early twentieth century, the human relations school started to emerge with Mary Parker Follet (1924) and Cherter Barnard (1938) . This school that influenced management from mid twentieth century onward characterized organizations in terms of the need to harmonize and coordinate group efforts, emphasizing people rather than machines, accommodations rather than machine-like precision. The focus shifted to the motivation of the individual and group, delegation of authority, employee autonomy, trust and openness, upward communication and authority, and leaders who function as a cohesive and motivational force.
The P&G historical timeline with the important business and organizational events from 1937 to 1987 before the matrix organization was introduced in the US is shown in Figure 1 . The transition from the classic line staff organization started in 1943 with the creation of the first categoryproduct division in 1943, the drug-products department. Nevertheless, it was only in 1954 that the US organization was organized into individual operating divisions to manage category-products with their own line and staff structures along two key dimensions: functions and brands.
Multidivisional-product structure Chandler (1962, p. 383-396) analyzing the history of a sizable sample of large US industrial enterprises concluded that their strategy determined their organization structures and that the common denominator between strategy and structure was the application of company resources to anticipated marked demand. He describes the four phases that can be discerned in the history of these large companies: the initial expansion and accumulation of resources; the rationalization of the use of resources; the expansion into new markets and product-lines to help assure the continuing full use of resources; and finally the development of a new structure to make possible continuing effective mobilization of resources to meet both changing short term market demands and long term market trend. He also points out that although each company had a distinct and unique history, nearly all followed along this general pattern. In the 1920s with the direct sales force, management felt the need to better coordinate the products across the functions and brand managers were introduced followed by a market-research department to understand customers and markets. This was the first shift away from the pure functional influence in the management decision process of the company to a light product influence.
The need to effectively mobilize resources to meet growing and more complex market demands, as pointed out by Chandler (1962, p. 383-396) , led to the multidivisional product structure in 1954, each with their how functions and brands, and some functional corporate coordination, particularly in R&D. Management decision process in the company was now firmly established with product influence and a light functional influence.
This shift in influence in the management decision process is shown in Figure 2 .
In the P&G US multidivisional-product organization established in 1954 was mainly focused in matching company strategy with product category market dynamics. Brand managers in the same product division competed in the market place but shared strong divisional functions. The divisional functions transferred best practices and talent across many brands, fostering leading-edge competencies in R&D, manufacturing, and market research in a rapidly developing consumer-product industry. Corporate R&D In 1987, the US organization reorganized into the product-category divisions introduced in Europe in the early 1980s. This was an historical shift away from the competitive brand-management system put in place in 1931. Brands would now be managed as components of 39 productcategory portfolios by category divisional general managers, who also were responsible for the product-category functions. To strengthen functional influence, the matrix reporting structure was adopted and the divisional leaders reported directly to their divisional business leadership and had a dotted-line reporting relationship with their corporate functional leadership.
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At this point, it is important to understand why the P&G US organization structure in 1987 adopted the matrix. The purpose was to balance better the product and the functional influence in the management decision process as illustrated in Figure 2 . In the 1920s, the brand manager brought the product influence to bear in the decision process of the hierarchical functional organization structure and after 1954; it was the turn of corporate functional managers to bring the functional influence to bear on the hierarchical multidivisional-product structure. The matrix structure was the attempt to formally balance the two influences in the management decision process following the general trend in the industry. To better understand the matrix, the balance of the influence on the management decision process between two dimensions, and the problems and conflicts this generates we will give in a brief highlight how this organization structure came into being.
Emergence of the matrix
The matrix organization that emerged in the late 1960s from the aerospace industry, has its origins in the scientific management era of the early 1900s according to Galbraith (2009, p. 7) . He explains that it was Taylor (1911) who suggested the benefits of having multiple bosses that he labeled functional foremanship: a schedule boss, a quality boss, a tool boss, an administrative boss, and so on. The idea did not catch on because of the confusion of multiple bosses was to bring specialized skill directly to the workforce.
Galbraith goes on explaining that the acceptable position was articulated by Fayol (1949) This extract from the GE bulleting explains very well the complexity of implementing the matrix structure and the need to abandon all precepts of the mechanical school of organization and the need to embrace the modern practices of the human relations school.
Originally, organization structures were functional following the mechanical school with the purpose of optimizing resource allocation, of work specialization and cost reduction. The strategy was to compete in the market by efficiency in producing products or delivering services. As the business world became more complex organization structures evolved in response to this complexity and started creating coordination mechanisms to manage additional dimensions like products, geography, and customers.
Some of these coordinating mechanisms were brand-product managers and functional teams as shown in Figure 2 .
The need to be efficient in at least two dimensions let to the development of the matrix structure where the functional side is responsible for efficient resource allocation and the market side is responsible for the efficient response to client needs. The dual-strategy is now focused on functional and on market efficiency to obtain organization effectiveness. The relative weight given to each strategy varies between companies and can be inclined toward functions, markets or balanced as shown in The conflicts in the matrix are commonly caused by the pursuit of the optimization of the overall strategy of the company that in many cases requires the sub-optimization of one or both of its dimensions. This need to eventually sub-optimize the dimensions in benefit of the whole is contrary to the mechanical organization school where success is measured by individuals work efficiency. Individuals in many cases do not understand or resist the idea of sacrificing their work efficiency in favor of another if the reward system and human resource policies do not take the need of suboptimization in favor of the overall objective into account. Galbraith (2009, p. 10-19) explains that the matrix organization is a collaborative organization. People must develop collaborative skills to share power in the organization. These are the skills that the modern human relations school promotes, like the harmonization and coordination of group efforts in organizations replacing the individual hero of the past. But to make this possible companies must ensure that their information and reward systems and human resource policies are aligned with the matrix organization structure and the overall strategy of the company and don't create biased behaviors distorting the cooperative behavior.
There are according to Davis & Lawrence (1977, p. 46-52) The top leadership has to be outside the matrix overseeing its operating performance and solving eventual conflicts. With their behavior, they have to incorporate the need to collaborate, sell this need to the subordinates, coach, and oversee their functioning, and ensure the adequate balance of power between the two dimensions. To avoid biases the strategy has to be set above the matrix structure and the balance of power of the dimensions by the top leadership and then implemented top down to the lower levels of the organization.
According to Davis & Lawrence (1977, p. 48) The subordinate with two bosses has to learn how to accommodate simultaneous and sometimes competing demands. This role is not different than that of the matrix and top leaders. All must pay heed to competing demands, evaluate alternatives, make trade-offs, try to convince others of their arguments, and manage conflicts that cannot be resolved. In this organization structure, the power to influence results derives directly from the person's acceptance by the team due to the quality and strength of its arguments and personality. Career success in a matrix derives more from getting things done by facilitating decisions than from making them. In this organization structure, there is no room for the egocentric individuals. The structure to be effective needs people that know how to work in teams, cooperate with each other, and take satisfaction from the team's success.
Problems with the matrix
The P&G historical timeline from the introduction of the matrix organization in 1987 to the announcement of the reorganization plan named
Organization 2005 in 1998 is shown in Figure 5 . After adopting the matrix in 1987 with 39 US product-category business units in the later 1980s, the matrix was expanded to include Europe. Country functions were consolidated into continental functions with doted-line reporting to the newly created global corporate functional leadership and direct reporting to regional product-category business managers.
In 1989, global corporate product-category presidents reporting directly to the CEO were created to better coordinate product-categories and branding worldwide. The country product-category business general managers had dotted-line reporting to these global corporate productcategory presidents located in Cincinnati and line reporting to the regional product-category business vice presidents who were responsible for their career progression and promotion. The product-category presidents were also given direct responsibility for global R&D in their product-category, who in turn had a dotted-line responsibility to global corporate R&D.
The reason for P&G to slowly migrate to the global matrix organization in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the success of the cross-border cooperation across functions in Europe, that set an example for the rest of the world, and the attractive expansion opportunities in Japan and developing countries in the late 1980s and the need to respond to the new challenge of appealing to more diverse consumer tastes and income levels.
In 1995 the structure was extended to the rest of the world through the creation of four regions -North America, Latin America, Europe (including Middle East and Africa), and Asia -each which a president reporting directly to the CEO and responsibility for profit and loss.
The P&G global matrix three dimensional organization chart is shown in The strong global and regional functions that had promoted extraordinary benefits appeared to create a strong imbalance in the matrix structure in detriment of the country product-category managers. The matrix structure was never intended to be balanced and was designed to be product-category dominant or market dominant as shown in Figure 3 . This was a shift to the middle from the multidivisional-product organization of 1954 as shown in Figure 2 . The intended dominant influence on the decision process of the regional product-category was clearly defined by the solid line reporting and their profit and loss responsibility as shown in Figure 6 .
The functional and the global product-category influence were intended to be secondary as demonstrates the dotted line reporting. 
CEO
Matrix pathologies
The pathologies of the matrix structure developed by P&G between 1987 and 1995 were probably properly diagnosed and corrected in the new Organization 2005. It is important to understand these errors to appreciate the new and successful matrix structure that is in place today. The same mistakes were made by many organizations in the 1970s and early 1980s
and led to the discredit of the matrix as explained in the introduction.
The first and most obvious problem is the need to abandon the mechanical school approach to managing an organization and create a culture of teams and collaboration. This is especially difficult for managers trained in business schools that stress individual class competition in business cases discussions instead of building consensus around a common goal. They have to abandon the idea of winning vis-à-vis others. The matrix operates in a balance of power model. The matrix leaders must understand that if they win the power struggle with other leaders absolutely the organization as a whole loses performance ultimately. They must understand that total victory in one of the dimensions only destroys the balance and the matrix. There are some examples of this type of pathology in the P&G matrix (Piskorski & Spaldini 2007, p. 7-8) .
Top leadership must understand that a power struggle will always develop between the dimensions. What they have to ensure that the matrix leaders are worthy adversaries and that they understand the need to turn the conflict to constructive common end. For this to work the top leadership has to manage three important things: prevent that one side totally wins or loses, ensure that the matrix leaders always maintain an institutional point of view, and remove those that through inability are constantly losing and replace them with stronger managers. Galbraith (2009, p. 10) stresses the need that the matrix organization form has to be implemented using a collaborative change process. He goes on saying that people should develop the collaborative skills they will need in their roles in the matrix structure during its implementation phase. The managers that were not properly prepared and simply ordered to collaborate usually faked it because they did not understand what it meant.
Many ordered to share power did not and passively resist the matrix. When the expected benefits of power sharing were not achieved, these resistors were quit to suggest that the matrix structure did not work. For this reason, many poorly managed change processes resulted in failure, even when the matrix structure was the best solution for the business.
The second problem was the high number of management layers and the imbalance in the design of the matrix structure. The matrix to function properly must have the proper balance and coordination between the matrix leaders so that the subordinates can properly negotiate, accommodate, and optimize the conflicting demands as shown in Figure 4 . The design of the P&G global matrix structure shown in Figure 6 clearly had serious design flaws accentuated by the many management layers that generated imbalance and conflicts between the three dimensions: global functions, regional product-categories, and global product-categories.
Applying to the Davis & Lawrence key roles to the P&G global matrix we can clearly identify the structural design flaws that created some of the operational problems that hindered its proper functioning. These design flaws are shown in Figure 7 . The top leader had simply too many subordinates to be able to properly coordinate the performance and solve conflicts with the matrix leaders at the region and country levels far down the organization.
The poor subordinated product-category-country general managers that were supposed to accommodate the competing demands were in a skewed position. They had a strong input from the regional-productcategory vice presidents to whom they were accountable for profit and loss.
The input from product-category president was weak because it came from far up in the organization hierarchy and bypassed their direct boss. The functional input bypassed them and went directly to their country functional managers. The regional vice presidents that were supposed to coordinate conflicts between country general managers and regional functional directors were skewed toward their regional president to whom they had profit and loss responsibility and did not balance properly the influence between region and country with the functions. The consequence of this distorted situation was that the country managers gave priority to financial results over product-category initiative and had a constant conflict with their functional managers.
The third problem was that the required complementary and reinforcing changes to the culture, the information and accountability system, the budgeting and planning process, and the performance, career and bonus system necessary to successfully implement the matrix structure had not been made. By keeping the processes and systems of the previous multidivisional organization structure P&G maintained the strong regional and functional silos that where co-responsible for its problems with the matrix structure.
The functional managers gave much more attention to the influence in the decision process to their functional leaders to whom they theoretically had only a dotted-line report in detriment to their regional and country leaders to whom they had full line reporting, This imbalance in the decision process was the consequence that the functional leaders determined their career paths and promotions of all the functional personal. The regional and country managers in their turn were responsible for profit and loss and complained about their lack of cooperation to reach their objectives of their functional subordinates that were set on following functional agendas. They were in their turn reluctant to implement product-category initiatives that affected their short-term financial results and consequently bonuses.
The main problems that P&G matrix structure had -the lack of a proper collaborative culture, the excessive management levels, and profit centers, the skewed design of the structure, and the disaggregating effect of its processes and systems -motivated its management to restructuring program named Organization 2005.
So not to be unfair with P&G management that originally implemented the matrix in 1987 it is important to note that these problems were common to most early matrix structures implemented following the management fashion in the 1970s and early 1980s and motivated many of them to abandon it and spread that "the matrix doesn't work". This believe was widely accepted at the time, according to Galbraith (2009, p. 10) , to the point that managers avoided the matrix, even in situation where it was appropriate. He continues explaining that because the matrix structures worked in some companies and benefit in certain situations the matrix concept was reinstated in the late 1990s and assumed its normal place in organization design theory.
P&G RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM
The objective of the restructuring program P&G announced in 1998 was to achieve $900 million in annual after-tax cost savings by 2004 by voluntary separation of 15 thousand employees, of with 10.5 overseas, and eliminating six management layers, reducing the total from 13 to 7, at a cost of &1.9 billion over five years. The plan also called for the dismantling of the global matrix structure introduced in 1995 and replacing it with an amalgam of independent organizations: Global Business Units with primary responsibility for products, Marked Development Organizations with primary responsibility for markets, and a Global Business Services unit responsible for managing internal business processes.
This new organization structure is now known as the front-back hybrid matrix according to Galbraith (2009, p. 115-127) . This structure has two parallel multifunctional line organizations: one focused on the customermarkets designated the front end, and a second focused on products designated the back end. The objective is to achieve simultaneously the customer focus and responsiveness and the global-scale economies. To effectively achieve these conflicting objectives the management challenge is to effectively link and balance the customer-market front end with the product back end in a matrix. The corporate functions form an additional matrix across the two parallel organizations.
The restructuring program
The The vision Jager had is typical of an entrepreneurial manager. These managers according to Degen (2009, p. 359-366) are excellent in producing the needed change in companies that became bogged down in an administrative stalemate like apparently P&G was. He explains that these managers have the vision and the courage to make the necessary changes.
However, they never stop to implement these changes and tend to continue making changes. They tend to have no patience for the detail required to execute the new strategy that they created. When this happens, they have to be substituted by administrative managers that are god implementers of changes. These managers are good executers but not entrepreneurial enough to make them. This seems to have been the case of P&G, where Jager made the entrepreneurial changes, created high expectation of immediate unrealistic results for such an ambitious restructuring program, and was substituted by Alan G. Lafley an excellent administrator and executer.
To better understand the personalities of Jager and Lafley and the context we reproduce some quotes from the press at the time. Before Jager became the CEO McLean wrote: Is P&G all washed up? (1997, p. 184 execution skills to manage the cost reduction objective, the radical change the organization structure, the voluntary separation of 15 thousan employees, the reduction from 13 to 7 management levels, the redesign of the internal processes and systems to the new structure and so on. Such a massive restructuring program normally creates all sorts of problems as middle management first resist and then adapts to the new structure. For this reason, results in the first years tend to suffer and the benefits only start appearing after some time as show for the P&G case in Figure 9 and 10. Jager, the entrepreneur, launched the restructuring program, was over optimistic, overpromised, and created the crisis. Lafley, the administrator, calmed the crisis, did not overpromise, focused the organization, and implemented the needed changes. The resulting new P&G organization front-back hybrid matrix structure is today an example of a successful organization design.
THE P&G FRONT-BACK HYBRID MATRIX ORGANIZATION
The key attribute of the matrix structure is the balance of power between the different dimensions of the company. One of the most direct ways to enhance the power of a dimension is to make it report higher up in The GBS led by a vice president that reported directly to the CEO and was responsible for standardizing, consolidating, streamlining, and ultimately strengthening business processes and IT platforms across GBUs and MDOs. GBS was organized into a cost center with three "follow-the-sun" service centers -Costa Rica, England, and the Philippines -to perform business-process work 24 hours a day.
This new structure solved four problems of the old structure: first it created a clear balance between these two key dimensions -customer focus and product focus; second it presented a unified sales contact for customers that is focused on sales growth of all products; third the productcategory business units with profit and loss responsibility have full control over their key functions; and fourth the service functions and corporate functions formed a third and fourth dimensions in matrix structures over the two key dimensions. The structure of Organization 2005 is a four-dimension front-back hybrid matrix with a top leader, a coordination council to define priorities and solve disputes, matrix leaders, and subordinates with the need to coordinate and balance four influences structure as shown in
Figure11.
The routines and policies that had created problems to the proper functioning of the matrix organization also streamlined and adapted to the new structure. A single business-planning process was created whereby all budget elements could be reviewed and approved jointly by the various matrix leaders. The incentive system was also overhauled and adapted to the new organization, maintaining the promote-from-within policy. The performance-based portion of the compensation for upper-level executives increased from 20 percent to 80 percent, with 40 percent up or down of base pay. Stock-option compensation was extended from previously less than then thousand employees to over hundred thousand.
Designing matrix structures that work
The success of the P&G clearly demonstrated by the growth of earnings in Figure 9 and the growth in net sales in Figure 12 was explained Galbraith (2002, p. 9-16) shown in Figure 13 . The pathologies of the early P&G matrix structure highlights the need to align all the five categories and not only strategy and structure. Strategy required that P&G to be excellent simultaneously at two different dimensions of the company -customers and products. The front-back hybrid matrix structure gave the company the ability meet these two challenges with the MDOs and the GBUs and at the same time build strong and efficient lateral processes with the GSO and the corporate functions as shown in Figure 11 . Only aligning strategy and structure was not enough to guarantee success. The reward and the process design policies had also to be well aligned and balanced between the competing dimensions.
Nevertheless, key to the proper functioning of the matrix structure are the people. Matrix is a collaborative organization form and people have to have the necessary collaborative skills to function properly.
Leadership in a matrix organization
Another key component of a successful matrix organization is a competent and collaborative leader at the top of the matrix. The top of the matrix is where the two, three, or four dimensions, as in the P&G case, come together. It is at this points that natural tensions between conflicting objectives come together and need to be resolved so that the overall objective of the organization prevails skewed dimension objectives. When these natural objectives are effectively and expediently resolved by collaboration between top and the matrix leaders, the matrix organization works well and is successful in all its dimensions. When the conflicts are not resolved, the organization suffers and in some cases becomes dysfunctional and paralyzed, as did the P&G organization before Organization 95 was introduced by Jager in 1999.
The top leader does not have to have the final word on all conflicts explains Galbraith (2009, p. 202) . He must see that all conflicts are effectively resolved. To achieve this he must create a collaborative team culture, design the appropriate lateral teams to solve conflicts, and provide the team participants with the training and infrastructure to support their decision making. He must also give the example on how the consensusdriven conflict resolution process works.
One of the several paradoxes of the matrix, write Davis & Lawrence (1977, p.48) , is that the matrix requires a strong unity of command at the top to ensure the proper balance of power down the organization and a same time strong subordinates participation in the decision process. This calls for a blend of autocratic and participative leadership styles.
This seems to have been exactly Lafley's style according to Brooker & Schlosser (2002, p. The main drive for P&G to choose the matrix structure was the need to pursue a multiple-priority strategy -customers and market focus, product focus and functional efficiency -besides the sharing of expensive resources.
The matrix pathologies developed during the 1980s and early 1990s. The first and most obvious problem was the need to abandon the mechanical school approach to managing an organization and create a culture of team and collaboration. The absolute boss behavior of the COO and later CEO Jager boosting: I break kneecaps. I make heads roll (Brooker 1999, p. 146-152 ) is absolutely contrary to what is needed to make a matrix organization work properly. The second and third problems was the high number of management layers and the imbalance in the design of the matrix structure, and that the required changes in the processes and systems necessary to implement the matrix structure had not been made.
These problems were common to most early matrix structures implemented following the management fashion in the 1970s and early 1980s and motivated many of them to abandon it. Authors like Peters & Waterman (1982, p. 306) argued against the use of the matrix based of these unsatisfactory experiences.
The sophisticated front-back hybrid matrix structure designed and implemented under Jager would have failed if Lafley with is autocratic and participative stile and above all his grasp of the many details needed to make it work had not taken over in the right moment. This is again a demonstration that the CEO defines the strategy and culture of an organization. If he gets it right, the organization succeeds like P&G did.
